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I. INTRODUCTION 
You own a dry cleaner shop.1 In the winter, it gets cold, both 
for your employees and your customers. But, you have a 
commercial steamer that has a lot more capacity to produce 
steam than you ask of it. Maybe you can use that excess steam to 
run a heater and keep everybody warm. 
So, you contact a commercial heating company and explain 
that you want a heating system that will run off of the excess 
steam produced by your existing equipment. The owner of the 
heating company, Pat, comes to your shop, takes some 
measurements, does some calculations, and recommends a 
heating system for you. 
You sign a contract for the system Pat recommended, looking 
only to see that the amount you are going to pay and the 
installation dates are what were agreed upon. You don’t notice 
that there is no promise about the heating system being able to 
be powered by your existing equipment, because, well, Pat 
seemed to know what he was doing and you are sure Pat 
understood what you wanted. And anyway, you’re not a lawyer. 
But when the system gets installed, it turns out it needs more 
steam to work properly than your steam machine can produce. 
You sue the heating company, saying there was a breach of 
warranty. After all, you told Pat your requirements for the heating 
system and he suggested and installed one thereafter. Pat’s 
lawyers, however, point out that there was a clause in the contract 
that disclaimed the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
You ask your lawyer about it and she says she will fight for you, 
but Pat’s lawyers have a point. She explains if Pat had articulated 
a promise to provide you with a heating system that would be 
powered by your existing equipment, then Pat would have made 
an “express warranty”2 and the disclaimer in the contract would 
be inoperative.3 But because you said you wanted a heating 
system that would be powered by your existing equipment, and 
Pat just recommended a particular unit knowing you were relying 
 
 1 This hypothetical is based on Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., 1965 WL 8338, 2 U.C.C. 
Rep. Serv. 772, 774 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. May 11, 1965). For a discussion of the case in greater 
detail, see infra notes 109–115 and accompanying text. 
 2 There would be an express warranty in this situation because the seller would 
have made an “affirmation of fact” about the heating system, which became part of the 
“basis of the bargain.” See infra note 11 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-313, which codifies the 
requirements to establish an express warranty, and see infra note 13 for a discussion of 
the meaning of the “basis of the bargain.” 
 3 This is the dictate of U.C.C. § 2-316(1), see infra text accompanying note 126. 
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on his recommendation, what you got is what is called a “warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose,”4 which can be disclaimed.5 
You shake your head and argue that Pat did promise to 
install a system that met your needs—he heard what your needs 
were, and recommended, sold, and installed such a system. 
Aren’t Pat’s acts the same as a promise that the product Pat 
recommended would meet your needs? Your lawyer counsels that 
it might seem that way to a lay person, but in the law, there is a 
difference on which warranty you get depending on who first 
brings up the attribute of the good that constitutes the warranty. 
And the effectiveness of a disclaimer depends on that as well. 
You tell your lawyer such distinctions are ridiculous, and the law 
is an ass if the outcome of your case really turns on who 
mentions first “the attribute of the good that constitutes the 
warranty.” You are right. 
The premise of this Article is that implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose, formed in the English common 
law and now codified in U.C.C. § 2-315,6 should be eliminated 
from Article 2 and American common law.7 Not because the 
 
 4 There would be a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose in this situation 
because the seller had “reason to know [of the] particular purpose for which the goods 
[were] required,” and knew that the “buyer [was] relying on the seller’s skill or judgment 
to . . . furnish suitable goods.” See infra note 6 for the text of U.C.C. § 2-315, which 
codifies the requirements to establish a warranty of fitness. 
 5 This is the dictate of U.C.C. § 2-316(2) and (3), see infra text accompanying 
notes 105–108.  
 6 The current version of U.C.C. § 2-315 provides: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular 
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the 
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless 
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the 
goods shall be fit for such purpose. 
U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017). 
The provision has been adopted in the commercial codes of all jurisdictions that have fully 
adopted the U.C.C. See infra note 77. 
 7 For clarification, this article is not discussing the property law version of the 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. In property law, the “warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose” derives from Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348 (1892), and applies 
solely to short-term rentals of furnished residential space. The modern implied warranty 
of habitability developed out of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, but the 
latter has survived alongside the warranty of habitability. The requirements of the 
doctrine of constructive eviction are not generally a prerequisite for termination of the 
lease if there is a breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, even in states 
in which such requirements must be met to permit termination as a remedy for breach of 
the warranty of habitability. On the other hand, this Article focuses on the warranty of 
fitness quality warranty that is generated upon a sale of goods. This Article also does not 
deal with the warranty provisions of the United Nations Convention for the International 
Sales of Goods (1980) (“CISG”), which are principally contained in Article 35 of the CISG. 
However, the if the premise of the Article were adopted by the CISG drafters, Article 
35(2)(b), dealing with goods “fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made 
known to the seller at the time of the conclusion of the contract” would be deleted. In its 
stead, cases that would have previously been decided under Article 35(2)(b) would instead 
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warranty fails to protect important interests—it does. And not 
because the plaintiffs who recover under it are not worthy—they 
are. Rather, the implied warranty of fitness should be eliminated 
from the Code because the factual situations which give rise to it 
are more properly analyzed as express warranty claims, thus 
making the warranty unnecessary. 
In addition to the benefits of aligning the legal issue with its 
proper theory, eliminating the warranty and analyzing fitness 
cases as express warranty problems will also solve various 
practical and theoretical problems that have dogged the implied 
warranty of fitness for decades. These include: (1) eliminating the 
differential treatment as to warranty disclaimers between 
express and implied fitness warranties, as discussed above, and 
installing a more equitable and pro-consumer doctrine in its 
stead;8 (2) abolishing the conundrum that has bedeviled courts 
and practitioners for almost a century, regarding the proper 
implied warranty to be alleged and proven where the “ordinary 
purpose” of a good is claimed to be the buyer’s “particular 
purpose”;9 and (3) installing a proper parol evidence rule analysis 
when what is currently a fitness warranty is involved.10 
This Article has three major substantive parts. Part II 
explains why the proper theory for fitness problems is through an 
express warranty theory. Part III traces a brief history of the 
fitness warranty in the King’s courts, demonstrating that even 
from its inception, express warranty was the proper theory to 
resolve fitness issues. In fact, the judges who decided the 
inaugural case ushering in the implied warranty of fitness held 
that the express warranty was the proper theory to decide the 
case. Part IV explains some beneficial collateral consequences of 
subjecting fitness problems to the express warranty analysis, 
including resolving some persistent failings of the Code that have 
long plagued courts and practitioners dealing with the fitness 
warranty. Finally, an appendix is attached, with suggested edits to 
the U.C.C. to bring about the changes suggested by this Article. 
 
 
be adjudicated under Article 35(1), which requires a seller to deliver “goods which are of 
the quantity, quality, and description required by the contract . . . . ” 
 8 For a further explanation and discussion of the disclaimer issue, see infra Part IV(B). 
 9 For a further explanation and discussion of the confusion about the proper warranty 
when the ordinary purpose and particular purposes are coincident, see infra Part IV(A). 
 10 For a further explanation and discussion of the parol evidence rule issue, see 
infra Part IV(C). 
Do Not Delete 5/22/20 8:28 AM 
2020] The Unnecessary Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose 167 
II. WHY A “FITNESS” WARRANTY IS REALLY AN EXPRESS 
WARRANTY 
Perhaps the best way to explain why the express warranty 
provision is the correct analytical framework for what would 
currently be a warranty of fitness case, is by illustration: 
Situation I: A buyer walks into a dive shop. She walks 
over to the section of the store that sells watches and says to the 
storeowner, “My dive watch broke and I’m looking for a 
replacement.” The owner replies, “I like the Acme 200. It’s what 
I use. It stays watertight down to 200 feet.” He then selects a 
new Acme 200 from the display case and hands it to her. The 
buyer says, “I’ve been doing some deeper diving lately, so a 
watch that will be watertight down to 200 feet is just what I 
need. I’ll take your recommendation.” She then purchases the 
watch and takes it on her next dive. 
Situation II: The same buyer walks into the same store, 
and tells the same owner, “My dive watch broke and I am looking 
for a replacement. I’ve been doing some deeper diving lately, so I 
need a watch that will stay watertight down to 200 feet. What do 
you recommend?” The owner says, “I like the Acme 200. It’s what 
I use,” and selects a new Acme 200 from the display case and 
hands it to the buyer. She responds, “I’ll take your 
recommendation.” She then buys the watch and takes it on her 
next dive. 
Traditional warranty law would say that an express 
warranty is created in Situation I, because there is an 
“affirmation of fact” by the seller which “relates to the goods” and 
which “becomes part of the basis of the [sales] bargain.”11 On the 
 
 11 U.C.C. § 2-313 provides: 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer 
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
affirmation or promise. 
(b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to 
the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall conform to 
the sample or model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use 
formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific 
intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation merely of the value of the 
goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or 
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 
U.C.C. § 2-313. 
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other hand, warranty law would say that an implied warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose is created in Situation II, because “the 
seller at the time of contracting ha[d] reason to know” of the 
“particular purpose for which the [watch was] required” and because 
“the buyer . . . rel[ied] on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or 
furnish suitable goods.”12 This analytical distinction is nonsense. 
Legally, the two situations produce the same contract. In 
both situations, the law should (and does) protect the buyer’s 
legitimate expectation of acquiring a watch that will stay 
watertight down to 200 feet and has a claim against the seller if 
it does not. As such, the two situations should be analyzed 
identically, and, as explained below, the express warranty theory 
is the proper framework for such analysis. 
The only factual difference between the two situations is 
that the seller in Situation I initially mentions the warranted 
attribute of the good, whereas the buyer mentions the warranted 
attribute of the good in Situation II. However, in both situations, 
at the time of sale, it can be fairly said that: (1) the seller has 
promised the buyer that the watch will be watertight down to 
200 feet; and (2) the buyer was relying on that promise in 
deciding to purchase the watch.13 As such, both situations should 
be analyzed and interpreted the same way, namely by protecting 
 
 12 Id. § 2-315. 
 13 Of course, there is some disagreement whether the buyer must show reliance in 
order to recover for an express warranty due to a disagreement over the meaning of the 
term “basis of the bargain” in the statute. While many courts view the term as a synonym 
for reliance, see, for example, Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44 
n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (“The requirement that a statement be part of the basis of the bargain in 
order to constitute an express warranty ‘is essentially a reliance requirement . . . .’” (quoting 
Sessa v. Riegle, 427 F. Supp. 760, 766 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d, 568 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1978))), 
others believe it means only that the affirmation regarding the attribute of the good need 
only be said during the bargaining process. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Laird, 432 
So. 2d 1259, 1261 (Ala. 1983) (stating that a showing of reliance is not necessary to give 
rise to express warranties); see also Daughtrey v. Ashe, 413 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Va. 1992) 
(“In our opinion, the ‘part of the basis of the bargain’ language of Code § 8.2–313(1)(b) 
does not establish a buyer's reliance requirement. Instead, this language makes a seller's 
description of the goods that is not his mere opinion a representation that defines his 
obligation.”). There are even some who believe it shifts the burden to the seller to prove 
there was no reliance. See, e.g., Hauter v. Zogarts, 534 P.2d 377, 383–84 (Cal. 1975). See 
generally Steven Z. Hodaszy, Express Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Is 
There a Reliance Requirement?, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 468, 475–84 (1991); J. David Prince, 
Defective Products and Product Warranty Claims in Minnesota, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 
1677, 1687–90 (2005). The point here, however, is not to argue for the correctness of any 
one of these views, but rather to establish that the analysis of the contracts arising from 
Situation I and Situation II should be the same in this regard. At most, a buyer in any 
jurisdiction would have to establish reliance, which is shown in both Situations I and II. 
In addition, if a jurisdiction would not require reliance on the part of the buyer to form an 
express warranty in Situation I, it should not require a greater showing to find an 
enforceable promise of water tightness in Situation II.  
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in the same manner the expressed attribute of the good that is an 
important part of the parties’ bargain.  
One of the problems in how the law currently approaches 
fitness cases is that it labels the warranty involved as an 
“implied” warranty. Analytically, it makes sense to call the 
implied warranty of merchantability, set forth in U.C.C. § 2-314, 
an “implied” warranty,14 for what is implied in establishing the 
merchantability warranty is the warranty itself. That is, no party 
has to promise or request during the bargaining process that the 
good will be “fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods 
are used,”15 or be “of fair [and] average quality within the 
description,”16 or “pass without objection in the trade under the 
contract description”17—which are some of the statutory definitions 
of merchantability. The parties do not need to utter such terms 
because, unless disclaimed, those terms are implied-in-law and 
become part of the contract with a merchant seller sub silentio. 
On the other hand, with a fitness warranty, the warranted 
attribute of the good—that the watch is waterproof down to 200 
feet in Situation II above—is expressly stated, albeit initially by 
the buyer. What is implied is the seller’s adoption or ratification 
of the attribute specified by the buyer, i.e., that the seller 
willingly “stands behind” or vouches for the attribute. However, 
under any view of normative bargaining, such adoption is fairly 
attributed to the seller by his or her actions and words. Indeed, 
the entire warranty of fitness is dependent upon the act of the 
 
 14 U.C.C. § 2-314 provides: 
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall 
be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant 
with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food 
or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale. 
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as 
  (a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and 
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the 
description; and 
  (c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and 
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, 
quality and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and 
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may 
require; and 
(f) conform to the promise or affirmations of fact made on the container or 
label if any. 
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may 
arise from course of dealing or usage of trade. 
U.C.C. § 2-314.  
 15 Id. § 2-314(2)(c). 
 16 Id. § 2-314(2)(b). 
 17 Id. § 2-314(2)(a). 
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seller in providing a good that meets the buyer’s “particular 
[expressed] purpose.” Therefore, in contractual terms, the 
“implied” part of the implied warranty of fitness arises from an 
implied-in-fact contract, or one which “arises from mutual 
agreement and intent to promise, when the agreement and 
promise have simply not been expressed in words.”18 Although it 
may initially seem that identifying a fitness warranty as an 
implied-in-fact contract may argue against analyzing it as an 
express warranty, just the opposite is true. This is because, 
analytically, the law treats implied-in-fact contracts identically 
with express contracts.19 Further, the notion that an act can have 
a communicative quality is well established in the law; for 
example, in waiver and hearsay cases.20 Thus, no “analytical 
stretch” is necessary to look at fitness situations through the 
express warranty lens. In fact, the law, and the history of the 
warranty itself, command it. It is to the latter we turn next. 
III. HOW DID WE GET HERE? A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FITNESS 
WARRANTY 
An appropriate place to start tracing the history of the 
fitness warranty is the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
during the time of the Industrial Revolution.21 English common 
law of contract had incorporated the concept of consideration for 
about a century,22 and contract claims were being brought in 
 
 18 1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:5 (4th ed. 2007). 
 19 Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 959 (Cal. 1953) (“The only distinction 
between an implied-in-fact contract and an express contract is that, in the former, the 
promise is not expressed in words but is implied from the promisor's conduct. . . . Under 
the theory of a contract implied in fact, the required proof is essentially the same as under 
the first count upon express contract, with the exception that conduct from which the 
promise may be implied must be proved.”). 
 20 See e.g., United States v. Abou-Saada, 785 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1986) (“We agree . . . that 
[Defendants’] pointing amounts to hearsay, for it is conduct intended as an assertion.”); People 
v. Zollbrecht, 548 N.Y.S.2d 380, 384 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. 1989) (“The Court . . . finds that 
Mr. Sannicandro's statements made by way of a deliberate blinking of his eyes at a time when 
he was incapable of verbally communicating are admissible.”); Marles v. State, 919 S.W.2d 
669, 671 (Tex. App. 1996) (“Many nonverbal actions of a defendant at the time of arrest 
are relevant and admissible.”); 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 39:28 
(4th ed. 1990) (stating that intention to waive nonperformance of a condition under the 
Restatement Second of Contracts § 84 may be inferred from the waiving party’s actions). 
 21 BRUCE MAZLISH, THE FOURTH DISCONTINUITY: THE CO-EVOLUTION OF HUMANS 
AND MACHINES 64 (1993) (“All of these developments were rooted, if one can use that 
organic term, in the swelling movement toward mechanization characteristic of the 
Industrial Revolution. Of course, that revolution drew upon earlier developments, both 
technical and conceptual. Only the degree and sweep of what happened in the Western 
world in the period from around 1760 to 1850 justifies the use of the term revolution.”).  
 22 8 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 7 (1925) (“[T]he leading 
characteristics of consideration . . . emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries . . . .”). 
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assumpsit.23 Express warranties were well recognized,24 and 
mostly in the form we have today.25  
At the turn of the nineteenth century, caveat emptor was still 
a guiding mercantile principle,26 and because of it, the courts 
held there was no need for any implied warranty—whether 
merchantability or fitness.27 That is, if the bread was moldy or 
the cloth too sheer for making a coat, the law assumed buyers 
would have noticed these defects during the bargaining process, 
and if they did not, well, that was their “tough luck.” However, as 
commercial opportunities increased during the Industrial 
Revolution, English sellers progressively stopped being 
peripatetic, for they did not have to travel to foreign countries to 
purchase goods and bring them back to England, a la Marco 
Polo.28 Instead, they ordered goods from foreign suppliers 
without first seeing them, or having seen only a sample.29 Rather 
than telling the English buyers that it was their “tough luck” for 
dealing with a sharp-practicing foreign seller who shipped 
inferior goods, the English courts instead instituted an implied 
warranty of merchantability in 1815, establishing a minimum 
 
 23 Id. at 6 (“[I]t was during the latter half of the sixteenth century that assumpsit 
became alternative to debt. . . . By the end of the century, therefore, it had become 
definitely the chief contractual action of the common law.”).  
 24 See, e.g., James B. Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1888) 
(referencing a 1383 case held to be “perhaps, the earliest reported case upon a 
warranty”); Denison v. Ralphson (1682) 86 Eng. Rep. 235, 235; 1 Ventris, 365, 365 
(stating that the Defendant was “to deliver to him ten pots of good and merchandizable 
[sic] pot-ashes, and that not regarding his promise, and to defraud him, he delivered him 
ten pots of ashes not merchandizable [sic], but mixed with dirt”). 
 25 See, e.g., Walker v. Milner (1866) 176 Eng. Rep. 773, 775 n.a; 4 F. & F. (“The best 
definition that can be given of a warranty—that it is a representation made part of the 
contract—appears to imply that it is a representation of some certain and existing—past 
or present—matter of fact; known or capable of being known; as that the article is the 
work of a certain maker or manufacturer . . . .”).  
 26 See, e.g., Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE 
L.J. 1133, 1186 (1931) (“Not until the nineteenth century, did judges discover that caveat 
emptor sharpened wits, taught self-reliance, made a man—an economic man—out of the 
buyer, and served well its two masters, business and justice.”) 
 27 See, e.g., Parkinson v. Lee (1802) 102 Eng. Rep. 389, 391; 2 East 314, 320–21 (“No 
implied warranty can be raised from a fair price in the sale of hops any more than in the 
sale of a horse, where it is admitted that it does not exist. . . . If then an implied warranty 
be to be raised in this, it must in all other cases of sale; and then the maxim of caveat 
emptor will become an exception instead of a general rule.”). 
 28 See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 204 (E.M. Morgan 
ed., 1930) (In “a community whose trade is only one step removed from barter . . . [t]wo vital 
presuppositions reign: first, that the goods in question are there to be seen; second, either 
that everybody knows everybody’s goods, individually, in a face-to-face, closed, 
stable group . . . .”). 
 29 Id. at 204 (“Overseas trade in seaports introduces . . . dealing in goods at a distance, 
before they can be seen. Markets widen with improved transportation . . . [and] [t]his means 
reliance on distant sellers.”). 
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quality for commercially traded goods.30 An example of this is 
shown in Gardiner v. Gray, a case dealing with the sale of twelve 
bags of “waste silk,” where Lord Ellenborough opined: 
Where there is no opportunity to inspect the commodity, the maxim of 
caveat emptor does not apply. He cannot without a[n] [express] 
warranty insist that it shall be of any particular quality or fineness, 
but the intention of both parties must be taken to be, that it shall be 
saleable in the market under the demonination [sic] mentioned in the 
contract between them.31  
Another example is in Laing v. Fidgeon, a case dealing with a horse’s 
saddle, where Chief Justice Gibbs stated, “[T]he [seller] . . . ought to 
furnish a merchantable article.”32 
The first mention of a fitness warranty in the King’s Courts 
came ten years later in an opinion by Chief Justice Charles 
Abbott (Lord Tenterden), who was both the trial judge and one of 
the appellate judges in Gray v. Cox. In his capacity as appellate 
judge, Chief Justice Abbott said:  
At the trial it occurred to me, that [when] a person sold a commodity for 
a particular purpose, he must be understood to warrant it reasonably fit 
and proper for such purpose. I am still strongly inclined to adhere to 
that opinion, but some of my learned brothers think differently.33  
His reasoning did not attract the concurrence of the other 
judges, but the term a buyer’s “particular purpose,” and the 
suggestion that a warranty arises when a seller affirms that the 
goods sold are “fit” for that purpose under it, had made their 
appearances in the common law.34 However, even taking Chief 
Justice Abbott’s words at face value, a new implied warranty of 
fitness was neither needed, nor called for. It would be equally 
plausible to say that if a seller communicated, directly or 
 
 30 Calvin W. Corman, Implied Sales Warranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 1958 
WIS. L. REV. 219, 219–21 (1958). 
 31 (1815) 171 Eng. Rep. 46, 47; 4 Camp. 144, 145.  
 32 (1815) 128 Eng. Rep. 974, 974; 6 Taunt. 109, 109.  
 33 (1825) 107 Eng. Rep. 999, 1002; 4 B. & C. 107, 115.  
 34 The short summary of the influence of the Industrial Revolution on the gestation 
and birth of the two implied warranties given above is certainly the traditional view, and 
is an accurate one if only the decisions in the King’s Courts are examined. See generally 
Ames, supra note 24, at 8–10. I am working on an article tracing warranty’s history in 
greater detail, and the full story is a bit more nuanced. There are references to cases 
decided on what we would now call “warranty of merchantability” and “warranty of 
fitness” theories hundreds of years earlier in alternative, arbitral fora applying the 
principles of the Law Merchant. See, e.g., 1 SELECT CASES CONCERNING THE LAW MERCHANT, 
A.D. 1270–1638 91 (Charles Gross ed. & trans., Selden Soc’y No. 23, 1908); 2 SELECT CASES ON 
THE LAW MERCHANT, A.D. 1239–1633 28–30 (Hubert Hall ed. & trans., Selden Soc’y No. 46, 
1930); 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS 182 (Mary Bateson ed. & trans., Selden Soc’y No. 21, 1906). 
These fora included the courts of piepowder and staple, as well as other arbitral 
“courts.” See generally Charles Gross, The Court of Piepowder, 20 Q.J. ECON. 231 
(1906); Hamilton, supra note 26, at 1133.  
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indirectly, through words or actions, that a good she35 sold would 
satisfy a “particular purpose” of the buyer, a warranty based on 
the express promise arising from those words and actions would 
be established upon the conclusion of the bargain. 
The first case ushering in the warranty of fitness as part of 
the common law’s permanent consumer protection arsenal was 
decided four years later in Jones v. Bright.36 Jones serves as an 
example of hard cases make bad law.37 The case is hard because 
of its unusual facts, which are unlikely to be repeated. 
Regardless, as will be shown below, the common interpretation of 
the case—that it ushered in a new implied warranty38—was 
incorrect from its inception. In fact, the judges who decided Jones 
thought it was an express warranty case, and the facts certainly 
fit an express warranty theory.  
In Jones, the Plaintiff-buyer, Jones, owned a ship called the 
Isabella.39 The Defendant-seller, Bright, owned a business that 
manufactured and sold copper plates.40 The Plaintiff wanted to 
purchase the Defendant’s copper plates to sheath the underside 
of the Isabella.41 Copper under-cladding for a ship usually lasted 
four to five years.42 
If the facts of the case were “typical” for a fitness case, the 
Plaintiff would have gone to Defendant’s shop and had some 
conversation with the seller about the attributes and suitability 
of the copper plates for the Isabella. The analysis would then be 
whether the discussion of those attributes constituted a 
warranty. However, that did not happen. Instead, the following is 
what we are told: 
Fisher, a mutual acquaintance of the parties, introduced them to each 
other, saying to the Defendants, “Mr. Jones is in want of copper for 
 
 35 Single women were traders in England from at least the fourteenth century. 1 
BOROUGH CUSTOMS 227 (Mary Bateson ed. & trans., Selden Soc’y No. 18, 1904). 
 36 Jones v. Bright (1829) 130 Eng. Rep. 1167. There can be little doubt that Jones 
was decided as part of the emerging English consumer protection law. Lord Chief Justice 
Best, one of the judges who decided Jones, said: 
It is the duty of the Court, in administering the law, to lay down rules calculated 
to prevent fraud; to protect persons who are necessarily ignorant of the qualities 
of a commodity they purchase; and to make it the interest of manufacturers and 
those who sell, to furnish the best article that can be supplied. 
Id. at 1171. 
 37 See Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 659 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Just as 
‘bad facts make bad law,’ so too odd facts make odd law.”); Winterbottom v. Wright (1842) 152 
Eng. Rep. 402, 406 (“Hard cases, it has been frequently observed, are apt to introduce bad law.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Corman, supra note 30, at 220; Emlin McClain, Implied Warranties in 
Sales, 7 HARV. L. REV. 213, 218 (1893–1894); Jones, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1168.  
 39 Jones, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1168. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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sheathing a vessel, and I have pleasure in recommending him to you, 
knowing you will sell him a good article;” one of the Defendants 
answered, “Your friend may depend on it, we will supply him well.”43 
It is unclear whether this exchange moderated by Fisher was by 
letter or in person. On the one hand, it reads as if the 
introduction and response was by letter, as it is unlikely a 
defendant would say, “Your friend may depend on it,” if Jones 
was standing right there.44 However, one judge later suggested 
that this was “a loose conversation at the time of the sale.”45 In 
any event, this communication constituted the entire reported 
pre-sale discussion between the parties, and it is thus possible no 
promise whatsoever was directly communicated between the 
parties, and was only exchanged through Fisher.46  
However, either because Jones was part of the “we will 
supply him well” conversation, or was told about it later, he must 
have relied on that promise because he thereafter sent his 
shipwright47 to the Defendant’s warehouse. The shipwright 
rummaged through “sheets of various size, thickness, and 
weight”48 at the facility, and selected several sheets of copper 
that were purchased by the Plaintiff at “market price as for 
copper of the best quality.”49 While it is unlikely there was no 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. (emphasis added). 
 45 Id. at 1171 (opinion of Best, C.J.) (emphasis added). 
 46 Id. at 1172 (opinion of Best, C.J.). Sometime after the sale, Defendant sent 
Plaintiff an invoice which read simply, “Copper for the ship ‘Isabella,’” along with the 
price for the sheathing. Id. at 1168. By today’s commercial standards, we would expect the 
invoice to be generated at the time of sale, and thus be a potential source of warranty, but 
apparently that was not the tradition between merchants in England in the late 1800’s. 
As stated by Chief Justice Best, “An invoice, however, is frequently not sent till long after 
the contract is completed . . . .” Id. at 1171 (opinion of Best, C.J.). Only Chief Justice Best 
dealt with the issue of the invoice stating a warranty, and even he concluded that the 
promise, “We will supply him well,” was ultimately the warranty on which the verdict 
should be upheld: 
[I]f we look at the invoice alone, we see in the present case that the copper was 
expressly for the ship “Isabella.” However, I do not narrow my judgment to 
that, but think on the authority of a case not cited at the bar, Kain v. Old (2 B. 
& C. 634), that “where the whole matter passes in parol, all that passes may 
sometimes be taken together as forming parcel of the contract, though not 
always, because matter talked of at the commencement of a bargain may be 
excluded by the language used at its termination.” . . . Here, when Fisher, a 
mutual acquaintance of the parties, introduced them to each other, he said, 
“Mr. Jones is in want of copper for sheathing a vessel;” and one of the 
Defendants answered, “We will supply him well.” As there was no subsequent 
communication, that . . . amounted to a warranty. 
Id. at 1171–72.  
 47 A shipwright is a “[m]an skilled in the building and repairing of ships.” C.W.T. LAYTON, 
DICTIONARY OF NAUTICAL WORDS AND TERMS 341 (Brown, Son & Ferguson LTD, 2d ed. 1967). 
 48 Jones, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1168. 
 49 Id. 
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conversation while the shipwright was rummaging through the 
various plates at Defendant’s factory, there is, again, no record of it.  
The plates selected by the shipwright were put on the 
Isabella, and the vessel set sail for Sierra Leone. The copper 
failed on this first voyage, lasting but four months instead of the 
expected four to five years.50 There was a dispute between the 
parties as to what caused the premature breakdown of the copper. 
Plaintiff’s expert testified the reason was that the copper “might 
have imbibed more oxygen than it ought to contain” during its 
manufacture.51 On the other hand, Defendant claimed the failure 
was caused “from the singular inveteracy of the barnacles in the 
river at Sierra Leone, where the ship lay for some time.”52  
The trial judge left it to the jury “to determine whether the 
decay in the copper was occasioned by intrinsic defect or external 
accident; and if it arose from intrinsic defect, whether such defect 
were [sic] occasioned in the process of manufacture.”53  
The jury found that “the decay [in the copper] was occasioned 
by some intrinsic defect in the quality of the copper; but that 
there was no satisfactory evidence to shew [sic] what was the 
cause of that defect.”54 Verdict was therefore entered for the 
Plaintiff, with damages to be ascertained later by a specially 
appointed arbitrator.55 Hence, while the jury found that the 
copper was not up to snuff, it did not specifically find a breach of 
any warranty. As a result, the jury obviously did not identify 
what that warranty was¾that was left to be sorted out by the 
four appellate judges who heard the case.  
The judges were unanimous in holding the Defendant liable 
because he did not provide copper suitable for sheathing ships 
regardless of defect or accident.56 There were statements by each 
judge that could be read as resting the decision on a new implied 
fitness warranty. For example, Chief Justice Best explained that 
the fitness warranty was a natural extension of the implied 
warranty of merchantability: 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. In addition, the Defendant also asserted a caveat emptor/contributory negligence 
defense, claiming that, “the quality of copper might always be known by its appearance and 
malleability;” so that “if there had been any defect in [the copper] sold to the Plaintiff, his 
shipwright must have discovered it while in the act of sheathing the vessel.” Id. The jury 
apparently rejected this argument, as it found for the Plaintiff. Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 1173–74. 
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If a man sells an article, he thereby warrants that it is 
merchantable,—that it is fit for some purpose. This was established in 
Laing v. Fidgeon. If he sells it for a particular purpose, he thereby warrants 
it fit for that purpose; and no case has decided otherwise. . . . Whether or 
not an article has been sold for a particular purpose, is, indeed, a 
question of fact; but if sold for such purpose, the sale is an 
undertaking that it is fit.57  
A second judge, Sir James Park, opined that the fitness warranty 
had already been established in Chief Justice Abbott’s (Lord 
Tenterden’s) opinion mentioned above, Gray v. Cox, and that 
Jones was controlled by it: 
[I]s there not, where the purchaser cannot judge of the interior of the 
article, and buys for a particular purpose, an implied warranty, that 
the article is fit and proper for the purpose for which it is 
purchased? . . . The principal object of attack has been the case of 
Gray v. Cox, where Lord Tenterden said, “that if a person sold a 
commodity for a particular purpose, he must be understood to warrant 
it reasonably fit and proper for such purpose.” And this is not to be 
esteemed an obiter dictum, because the other judges differ from him. 
It is his judgment formally given, and goes to support the argument 
for the Plaintiff . . . .58 
Lord Burrough, a third judge in the case, explained his reasoning 
for upholding the verdict as follows: 
The Defendants knew what the copper was wanted for, and made 
it; . . . The copper, instead of lasting four or five years, lasted only one 
voyage, and this was proved to have been occasioned by a defect in the 
manufacture. I cannot comprehend why the action should not lie.59 
And finally, the fourth appellate judge who heard the case, Judge 
Gaselee, wrote: 
The case has been so fully gone into, that I shall make only one or two 
observations. . . . [I]t is clear that where goods are ordered for a 
particular purpose, the law implies a warranty that they are fit for that 
purpose. . . . How far the case might have been altered if the Defendants 
has not manufactured the copper, I do not say; but as to the warranty, 
the declaration could scarcely have been, other than it is.60 
The premise of this Article is that any implied fitness case is 
really an express warranty case, and such is true here, despite 
the language above suggesting an implied fitness warranty. None 
of the quoted language above is inconsistent with there being an 
express warranty implied from the acts and words of the seller. 
That is, if the focus was on a warranty arising from an expression 
 
 57 Id. at 1172 (opinion of Best, C.J.). 
 58 Id. at 1173 (opinion of Park, J.). 
 59 Id. at 1174 (opinion of Burrough, J.). 
 60 Id. at 1174 (opinion of Gaselee, J.). 
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of Defendant’s needs as communicated by Fisher: “Mr. Jones is in 
want of copper for sheathing a vessel;”61 then the case could be 
read as imposing on the Defendant an implied warranty that the 
copper would meet Jones’s needs when he thereafter sold 
Plaintiff the copper. However, if the focus is instead on the 
Defendant’s promise, “We will supply him well,”62 and the act of 
selling Jones the copper, then the case is more properly 
understood as a breach of warranty to supply suitable copper for 
cladding a ship expressly undertaken by the Defendant, since the 
copper did not “supply” Jones “well.” Hence, looking at it from the 
point of view of the Defendant creating the express warranty, 
what is “implied” is an express suitability warranty stemming 
from the words and actions of the Defendant in providing the 
copper after hearing of its intended use. It is the express promise 
(or rather the express warranty) of the Defendant under this 
view that serves as the basis of the claim. As noted above, 
analysis under such a theory is entirely consistent with the 
language from the judges quoted above. 
If we were to leave the case there, an argument could be 
made for interpreting it as either resting on an implied fitness 
warranty basis or an express warranty basis. However, three of 
the four judges themselves held that the theory on which the case 
was affirmed was breach of express warranty, derived from the 
“we will supply him well” promise, and the fourth said it did not 
matter whether the warranty was viewed as an express or an 
implied one. Chief Justice Best opined:  
Here, when Fisher, a mutual acquaintance of the parties, introduced 
them to each other, he said, “Mr. Jones is in want of copper for 
sheathing a vessel;” and one of the Defendants answered, “We will 
supply him well.” As there was no subsequent communication, that 
constituted a contract, and amounted to a warranty. . . . Here there 
has been, in my opinion, an express warranty.63 
Judge Burrough similarly stated: 
[A]fter Fisher had introduced the parties, and stated the purpose for 
which the Plaintiff wanted the copper, the Defendants warranted the 
article by undertaking to serve the Plaintiff well. . . . I put it on the 
ground of an express warranty and the finding of the jury that the 
copper was insufficient, and am of opinion that the verdict for the 
Plaintiff must stand.64 
 
 61 Id. at 1172 (opinion of Best, C.J.). 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. (emphasis added). 
 64 Id. at 1173–74 (opinion of Burrough, J.) (emphasis added). 
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Sir James Park stated, “the evidence of Fisher . . . goes to 
shew [sic] an express warranty . . . .”65 Finally, Judge Gaselee 
stated, “Without enquiring whether the warranty here be express 
or implied, it is clear that where goods are ordered for a 
particular purpose, the law implies a warranty that they are fit 
for that purpose.”66 
As such, read in its entirety, Jones should not be understood 
as, or used as precedent for, establishing a new implied warranty 
of fitness. Rather, the case should more properly be read to hold 
that when a defendant undertakes to supply a good that meets 
the specifications asked for by the buyer, by words and actions, 
those words and actions, by implication, constitute an affirmative 
promise that the goods will meet the specification. Thus, the case 
is more properly understood as an express warranty case, where 
the suitability of the copper for cladding the ship flowed from, 
and was, an implied-in-fact promise of the Defendant based on 
his sale of the copper to Jones after hearing of its intended use, 
and based on his promise to serve Jones “well.” As such, Jones is 
fundamentally the same case, and presents the same issues, as 
Situation II above. 
Even though the provenance for ushering in an entirely 
new warranty was thin in Jones, the case was cited throughout 
the remainder of the nineteenth century as establishing the 
fitness warranty.67 The warranty was thus reasonably well-
entrenched in the common law when Sir Mackenzie Chalmers 
followed the codification urgings of Jeremy Bentham68 and 
 
 65 Id. at 1173 (opinion of Park, J.) (emphasis added). 
 66 Id. at 1174 (opinion of Gaselee, J.) (emphasis added). 
 67 See, e.g., Brown v. Edgington (1841) 133 Eng. Rep. 751, 756 (opinion of 
Bosanquet, J.); 2 Man. & G. 279, 291 (“In Jones v. Bright, . . . the court was of opinion, 
that the defendants being informed of the purpose for which the sheathing was wanted, 
an implied warranty arose.”); Chanter v. Hopkins (1838) 150 Eng. Rep. 1484, 1487 
(opinion of Parke, B.); 4 M. & W. 399, 406 (“Now I agree with the authority which Mr. 
Byles has referred to, of Jones v. Bright, that if an order is given for an undescribed and 
unascertained thing, stated to be for a particular purpose, which the manufacturer 
supplies, he cannot sue for the price, unless it does answer the purpose for which it was 
supplied.”); Jones v. Just (1868) 3 QB 197 at 202–03 (Eng.) (“[W]here a manufacturer or 
dealer contracts to supply an article which he manufactures or produces, or in which he 
deals, to be applied to a particular purpose, so that the buyer necessarily trusts to the 
judgment or skill of the manufacturer or dealer, there is in that case an implied term or 
warranty that it shall be reasonably fit for the purpose to which it is to be applied. In such 
a case the buyer trusts to the manufacturer or dealer, and relies upon his judgment and 
not upon his own.”) (citations omitted). 
 68 Robert D. Brain & Daniel J. Broderick, The Derivative Relevance of Demonstrative 
Evidence: Charting its Proper Evidentiary Status, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 989–90 (1992) 
(noting that Jeremy Bentham, a nineteenth century English utilitarian philosopher, wrote a 
treatise, which was “arguably the most influential among scholars,” in which he attempted 
to structure and codify English law and urged others to do so). 
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authored the British Sales Act of 1893.69 Section 14(1) of that 
Act provided: 
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the 
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to 
show that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment, and the 
goods are of a description which it is in the course of the seller’s 
business to supply (whether he be the manufacturer or not), there is 
an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such 
purpose, provided that in the case of a contract for the sale of a 
specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is no 
implied condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose.70 
It is interesting that the British Sales Act expanded upon, 
and changed, the holding of Jones a bit. Under the Act: (1) the 
fitness warranty was limited to merchant sellers; (2) a specific 
reliance requirement was added before a plaintiff could be 
successful; and (3) the warranty was described as a condition, 
and not a term.71 
The implied warranty of fitness set forth in section fourteen 
of the British Sales of Goods Act was itself rewritten some by 
Professor Williston when he presented his “Draft of An Act 
Relating to the Sale of Goods” in 1903,72 as he eliminated the 
merchant limitation and described the effect of meeting the 
criteria as establishing a warranty term, not a condition, in 
section fifteen of the Act: 
 
 69 Chalmers first drafted the bill in 1888 and the draft was submitted to Parliament for 
comment; a revised draft was submitted in 1889 and referred to the Standing Committee on 
Law. M.D. Chalmers, The Codification of the Law of Sale, 12 J. INST. BANKERS 11, 14 (1891). 
Between Chalmers' initial draft and the final form of the UK Sale of Goods Act 
1893, there were changes in the language of the section concerned with fitness 
for purpose and merchantable quality that subtly altered meaning. One of 
these shifts concerns communication of a particular purpose. The initial draft 
required the buyer, relying on the seller's skill and judgment, to order goods for 
a particular purpose known to the seller. The April 1893 Bill required the 
buyer expressly or impliedly to make known to the seller the particular 
purpose so as to show the buyer relies on the seller. . . . It should also be noted 
that the side note that said caveat emptor was dropped.  
Gail Pearson, Reading Suitability against Fitness for Purpose—The Evolution of a 
Rule, 32 SYDNEY L. REV. 311, 321–22 (2010). See also Corman, supra note 30, at 224. 
(identifying Chalmers as the drafter of section fourteen). 
 70 Sale of Goods Act 1893, c. 71, § 14(1) (Eng.). 
 71 Other parts of section fourteen of the British Act, such as the “patent or trade 
name” exception, were put in different subsections in the American Sales of Goods Act. 
The idea behind this exception was that, if a buyer asked for a product with a particular 
trade name, e.g., a Ford F-150 Truck, a buyer could not bring a fitness claim if the truck 
lacked the towing capacity the buyer also mentioned he or she was looking for, since the 
buyer had, in essence, selected the product. See Corman, supra note 30, at 224–26.  
 72 SAMUEL WILLISTON, DRAFT OF AN ACT RELATING TO THE SALE OF GOODS § 15(1) (1903) 
(codified as amended at U.C.C. § 2-315 (1951)); see Corman, supra note 30, at 224 (identifying 
Professor Williston as the author of the Uniform Sales Act section fifteen). 
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Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the 
seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, and it 
appears that the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment 
(whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not), there is an implied 
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose.73 
The next major statutory adaptation of the warranty in the 
United States was in the original 1952 draft of the U.C.C., and 
that version remained unchanged in the 1972 version of the 
U.C.C.74 The U.C.C. drafters kept the Willistonian ideas of 
having the section be applied as a warranty term (as opposed to a 
condition), and rejecting the idea that the warranty be limited to 
only merchant-sellers. In addition, the U.C.C. changed two 
requirements of section fifteen. First, the requirement of the 
buyer having to make “known to the seller the particular purpose 
for which the goods are required,” was eliminated and replaced 
with a requirement that the seller “has reason to know any 
particular purpose for which the goods are required” from any 
source, not just from the buyer.75 The second change eliminated 
the requirement that, “it appear[] that the buyer relies on the seller’s 
skill or judgment,” and replaced it with a requirement that the buyer 
actually “rely[] on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish 
suitable goods.”76 The statutory warranty of fitness has largely been 
 
 73 WILLISTON, supra note 72, § 15(1) (emphasis added). 
 74 The 1952 version of § 2-315 Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular Purpose 
states the following:  
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular 
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the 
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless 
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the 
goods shall be fit for such purpose.  
U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1952). 
For comparison, see the 1972 version of § 2-315 Implied Warranty: Fitness for Particular 
Purpose, which states the following: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular 
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the 
seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless 
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the 
goods shall be fit for such purpose.  
U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1972).  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. The U.C.C. also modified the “patent or trade name” exception rule. See Corman, 
supra note 30, at 241. It removed it from the text, and added the following Comment:  
The elimination of the "patent or other trade name" exception constitutes the 
major extension of the warranty of fitness which has been made by the cases 
and continued in this Article. Under the present section the existence of a 
patent or other trade name and the designation of the article by that name, or 
indeed in any other definite manner, is only one of the facts to be considered on 
the question of whether the buyer actually relied on the seller, but it is not of 
itself decisive of the issue. If the buyer himself is insisting on a particular 
brand he is not relying on the seller's skill and judgment and so no warranty 
results. But the mere fact that the article purchased has a particular patent or 
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left unchanged since then, and has been adopted without change by 
every jurisdiction that has fully adopted the U.C.C.77  
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF ANALYZING “FITNESS” PROBLEMS UNDER 
AN EXPRESS WARRANTY THEORY 
In addition to the jurisprudential benefit of using the proper 
theory to evaluate a “fitness” case, eliminating the implied 
warranty of fitness provision and analyzing fitness cases under 
the express warranty theory would create three other collateral 
benefits: (A) it would eliminate the problem of trying to decide 
the proper implied warranty claim where the plaintiff’s 
particular purpose is the good’s general purpose; (B) the fitness 
warranty would appropriately be harder to disclaim; and (C) a 
more accurate application of the parol evidence rule to fitness 
situations would result.  
 
trade name is not sufficient to indicate non-reliance if the article has been 
recommended by the seller as adequate for the buyer's purposes. 
U.C.C. § 2-315, cmt. n.5 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 1952). 
 77 Alabama: ALA. CODE § 7-2-315 (LexisNexis 2019); Alaska: ALASKA STAT. 
§ 45.02.315 (2019); Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-2315 (2019); Arkansas: ARK. CODE 
ANN. § 4-2-315 (West 2019); California: CAL. COM. CODE § 2315 (Deering 2019); Colorado: 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 4-2-315 (2019); Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42a-2-315 (2019); 
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2-315 (2019); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.315 
(LexisNexis 2019); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 11-2-315 (2019); Guam: 13, GUAM CODE 
ANN. § 2315 (2019); Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 490:2-315 (LexisNexis 2019); Idaho: 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-2-315 (West 2019); Illinois: 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-315 
(West 2019); Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-2-315 (West 2019); Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 554.2315 (West 2019); Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN § 84-2-315 (West 2019); Kentucky: KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 355.2-315 (West 2019); Louisiana: LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 (2019); 
Maine: ME. STAT. tit. 11, § 2-315 (2019); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-315 
(West 2019); Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 106, § 2-315 (2019); Michigan: MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.2315 (West 2019); Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.2-315 
(West 2019); Mississippi: MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-2-315 (West 2019); Missouri: MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 400.2-315 (West 2019); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-2-315 (West 2019); 
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-315 (West 2019); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 104.2315 (LexisNexis 2019); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 382-A:2-315 
(LexisNexis 2019); New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-315 (West 2019); New Mexico: 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-2-315 (LexisNexis 2019); New York: N.Y. U.C.C. LAW § 2-315 
(Consol. 2019); North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2-315 (West 2019); North 
Dakota: N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 41-02-32 (West 2019); Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 1302.28 (LexisNexis 2019); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-315 (West 2019); 
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 72.3150 (West 2019); Pennsylvania: 13 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2315 (West 2019); Rhode Island: 6A R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-2-315 
(2019); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-315 (2019); South Dakota: S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 57A-2-315 (2019); Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-2-315 (2019); Texas: TEX. 
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (West 2019); Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-315 
(LexisNexis 2019); Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 2-315 (West 2019); Virginia: VA. 
CODE ANN. § 8.2-315 (2019); Virgin Islands: V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 11A, § 2-315 (2019); 
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.2.315 (LexisNexis 2019); West Virginia: W. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 46-2-315 (LexisNexis 2019); Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 402.315 (West 
2019); Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34.1-2-315 (2019). 
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A. Eliminating the Implied Warranty of Fitness Would Eliminate 
the Problems Associated with Deciding Which Implied Warranty 
Should Control When the “Ordinary Purpose” of the Good is 
Coincident with the Buyer’s “Particular Purpose” for the Good 
Having fitness cases resolved under an express warranty 
theory will provide the benefit of eliminating a persistent implied 
warranty issue, namely, which implied warranty is violated 
when a buyer’s “particular” purpose is the “ordinary” purpose for 
which the good is used.78 This is an issue because the implied 
warranty of merchantability is violated when goods are not “fit for 
the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used,”79 while, of 
course, the implied fitness warranty is violated when the goods 
are not fit for the “particular purpose” of the buyer. To illustrate, 
suppose a buyer goes into a Home Depot and asks for a barbecue 
that will allow her “to safely and deliciously barbecue steaks.” 
Assume the Home Depot representative recommends a particular 
model, and the customer buys it based on that recommendation. 
However, the purchased barbeque never gets hot enough to cook a 
steak properly because of some hard-to-discover manufacturing 
defect that put a clog in the gas line, which eventually causes the unit 
to explode. The unit did not fulfill the buyer’s particular purpose¾it 
did not allow the buyer to “safely and deliciously cook steak”¾but 
surely the ordinary purpose of any barbecue sold at Home Depot 
is to cook meats, like steaks, both safely and deliciously. So which 
warranty was violated by the defective grill¾the warranty of 
fitness for a particular purpose, the warranty of merchantability, 
or both?  
Many courts have answered that when the buyer’s particular 
purpose and the good’s ordinary purpose coincide, they merge 
together to form some sort of “fitability” warranty, and a plaintiff 
can recover under either theory. For example, in Great Dane 
Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Malvern Pulpwood, Inc., the buyer 
purchased “pulpwood trailers” in order to transport pulpwood, 
 
 78 See generally U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1972). To be clear, the situation I am describing is different from the 
situation in which a buyer conveys a non-ordinary, particular purpose to the seller, the 
seller furnishes what purports to be a suitable good, but the good turns out to be so 
shoddy that not only does it fail to serve the buyer’s particular purpose, but it is also 
unmerchantable. In that case, both implied warranties are violated, as contemplated by 
the U.C.C.’s drafters, “[a] contract may of course include both a warranty of 
merchantability and one of fitness for a particular purpose.” Rather, the situation I am 
speaking about above is that recurring subset of cases where the “particular purpose” of 
the buyer is the “ordinary purpose” of the goods. See U.C.C. § 2-315, cmt. n.2 (AM. LAW 
INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2017). 
 79 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(c) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 1972) (emphasis added). 
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which was also the ordinary purpose of the trailers.80 The trailers 
did not work very well and the buyer brought suit, claiming a 
breach of both the warranty of merchantability and of fitness.81 
At trial, however, the buyer only pursued the fitness claim, and 
the only jury instructions provided were on a fitness theory.82 
The seller claimed merchantability was the proper theory 
because it was not aware of any “particular purpose” for the 
trailers, and since no verdict was entered on that theory, the 
verdict in Plaintiff’s favor should be reversed.83 The court stated: 
Great Dane contends that it was aware only of the ordinary purpose to 
which the pulpwood trailers would be used—hauling pulpwood—and 
was unaware of any other purpose. Great Dane . . . states that before 
it can be liable for a breach of the warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose, it must be shown it, as a supplier, knew that a particular 
purpose was intended by the consumer, Malvern Pulpwood. Instead, 
Great Dane asserts only the ordinary purpose for which the trailers 
would be used was shown, giving rise to a warranty of 
merchantability—a warranty which was not incorporated in the 
instructions given the jury. Great Dane’s argument overlooks the fact 
that, under the circumstances of the case, the particular purpose 
involved was pulpwood hauling. If the particular purpose for which 
goods are to be used coincides with their general functional use, the 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose merges with the 
implied warranty of merchantability.84  
The idea of a merger of the two warranties is clever and has 
been used frequently by courts for nearly a century in these types 
of cases.85 However, the U.C.C. drafters instructed that 
 
 80 785 S.W.2d 13, 14, 17 (Ark. 1990).  
 81 Id. at 14. 
 82 Id. at 17. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). For lists of other cases where courts have 
merged fitness and merchantability concepts, see 1 JAMES J. WHITE, ROBERT S. 
SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10.36 929 n.1 (6th ed. 
2012), 1 DAVID G. OWEN & MARY J. DAVIS, OWEN & DAVIS ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 4:22 
272 n.7 (4th ed. 2014), and 3 DAVID FRISCH, LAWRENCE'S ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314:139 376 nn.10–11 (3d ed. 2013). 
 85 Professor Corman, in his article on the implied warranty of fitness, observed that 
appellate courts have upheld “ordinary purpose” claims on fitness grounds since the 1920s: 
The parallel growth of this implied warranty and of industry is typified by the 
automobile. At the beginning of the twentieth century the motor vehicle had 
scarcely left the inventor's workshops; by 1929, there were almost thirty-two 
million cars and trucks in use throughout the world. During the period of 
initial growth of the automobile industry, courts in England and the Unites 
States were liberal in finding both particular purpose and reliance in the 
purchaser's favor. Purchases for the purpose of use as a "pleasure car" or "for 
touring purposes," or "to convey the purchaser from place to place," are little 
more than application of the common or general purpose, and yet were found to 
justify reliance as purchases for a particular purpose. Similar decisions are to 
be noted in the related areas of trucks and farm tractors. 
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merchantability and fitness are separate and distinct theories. 
They have stated in the infamous Comment 2 to 2-315: 
A “particular purpose” differs from the ordinary purpose for which the 
goods are used in that it envisages a specific use by the buyer which is 
peculiar to the nature of his business whereas the ordinary purposes 
for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of 
merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the 
goods in question. For example, shoes are generally used for the 
purpose of walking upon ordinary ground, but a seller may know that 
a particular pair was selected to be used for climbing mountains.86 
Comment 2 may provide more shade than light when trying 
to adapt it to any particular case; nevertheless, it is fairly read as 
stating that the two implied warranties are separate because 
they have different purposes.87 That, also, is the prevailing view 
of leading commercial law commentators. For example, White, 
Summers, and Hillman say: 
Those unfamiliar with the differences between the warranty of 
merchantability (fitness for the ordinary purposes for which such 
goods are used) and the warranty of fitness for a particular purpose 
often confuse the two; one can find many opinions in which the judges 
used the terms “merchantability” and “fitness for a particular 
purpose” interchangeably. Such confusion under the Code is 
inexcusable. Sections 2-314 and 2-315 make plain that the warranty 
of fitness for a particular purpose is narrower, more specific, and more 
precise. . . . [However], [a]n increasing number of courts have held 
that the 2-315 warranty as to fitness for a particular purpose may 
arise when the buyer’s “specific use” is the same as the “general use” 
to which the goods under contract are usually put. We are wary of 
such cases. They apparently enlarge the scope of the 2-315 warranty 
beyond the intent of the drafters.88  
 
Corman, supra note 30, at 222–23 (footnotes omitted). The “fitability” merger theory is 
also present in cases like Minneapolis Steel & Mach. Co. v. Casey Land Agency, 201 N.W. 
172 (N.D. 1924). There, the buyer purchased a tractor for use on his farm, saying he 
needed it, among other things, for plowing. Id. at 173. The tractor did not meet the 
Plaintiff’s needs, and the court had the following to say with regard to situations in which 
the particular purpose and ordinary purposes are coincident:  
The “particular purpose” for which the tractor was purchased was for use in 
connection with general farm work, discing, plowing, etc. A “particular 
purpose” is not some purpose necessarily distinct from a general purpose. A 
particular purpose is, in fact, the purpose expressly or impliedly communicated to 
the seller, for which the buyer buys the goods; and it may appear from the very 
description of the article, as, for example, “coatings,” or a “hot water bottle.” 
Id. at 175. 
 86 U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. n.2 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON 
UNIF. STATE LAWS 1952).  
 87 Id. 
 88 WHITE, SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 84, at 928–30 n.1 (citations omitted).  
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The authors of a leading products liability treatise agree:  
More fundamentally . . . the fitness warranty is entirely distinct and 
independent from the implied warranty of merchantability. As lucidly 
explained in comment 2 to § 2-315, above, this distinction is so 
perfectly clear that one might reasonably conclude that an “ordinary” 
use by definition must be separate and distinct from a purpose that is 
“particular” to a buyer. . . . Notwithstanding the logic of this view, some 
courts remain confused. Perhaps led astray by comment 2 to § 2-315, a 
few courts have ruled that an ordinary use under § 2-314 can also 
amount to a particular purpose under § 2-315.89 
Another commercial treatise echoes this idea: 
The warranties of merchantability and of fitness for a particular 
purpose are distinct. . . . A court must not confuse the implied 
warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose. However, courts have done so. The fitness of goods 
for their ordinary use is covered by the implied warranty of 
merchantability as contrasted with the non-normal use that 
constitutes a particular purpose.90  
If fitness and merchantability are thus left as is, courts are 
left with two unappealing choices in these types of cases: (1) they 
can fashion a merged “fitability” warranty to ensure deserving 
plaintiffs will recover, but in doing so, ignore the dictates of the 
U.C.C.’s drafters; or (2) put the plaintiff (and his or her lawyer) to 
the task of selecting the “correct” (or at least “correct” in the 
court’s view) theory, with the possibility that recovery will be 
denied if the wrong choice is made. Choosing the “correct” theory 
is not just a matter of pleading¾it is also a matter of proof. 
Going to trial under a fitness theory requires putting on evidence 
that the seller “ha[d] reason to know” of the buyer’s 
requirements, and actual reliance by the buyer “on the seller’s 
skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods.”91 On the 
other hand, successfully trying a merchantability case requires 
proof of what the “fair average quality” is of the good delivered, 
or what are the “ordinary purposes for which such goods are 
used,” or what characteristics of the good would allow it to “pass 
without objection in the trade” in order to prevail.92  
 
 89 OWEN & DAVIS, supra note 84, at 271–72 (footnotes omitted). 
 90 FRISCH, supra note 84, at 376 (footnotes omitted). See also BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER 
SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES § 6:4 (2017) (“[T]he courts in many cases treat 
the two implied warranties as tweedledum and tweedledee, so that the same set of facts 
can lead to a breach of both.”).  
 91 See U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2017). 
 92 See Id. § 2-314(2). Of course, a successful plaintiff on a merchantability theory 
could also prevail upon establishing one of the other listed tests for merchantability in 
U.C.C. § 314(2), such as the good not being “adequately contained, packaged, and 
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The potential pitfalls in the difference in proof between the 
two implied warranties was illustrated in Schenck v. Pelkey.93 
There, the Plaintiff used the swimming pool slide manufactured 
by Defendants and suffered quadriplegic injuries after sliding 
down headfirst.94  
The trial court held for the Defendants.95 On appeal, the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut noted the following confusion by 
the trial court:  
The [trial] court construed the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged an 
implied warranty “that said slide would be reasonably fit for the purpose for 
which it was purchased,” to be a complaint invoking . . . the section of the 
Uniform Commercial Code that describes an implied warranty of fitness for 
a particular purpose.96  
In other words, although the Plaintiff alleged a breach of the 
warranty of merchantability (claiming the slide was not “fit for 
the ordinary purpose for which” such goods are used under 
U.C.C. § 2-314), the trial court interpreted the complaint as suing 
for breach of a warranty of fitness.97 The court, therefore, 
instructed the jury that the Plaintiff had to show that the 
manufacturer knew of the particular purpose for which the 
Plaintiff wanted the slide, and relied on some sort of advertised 
purpose by the Defendants promising to fulfill that purpose to 
prevail.98 Since the Plaintiff’s lawyer made no such showing, the 
jury was left with “virtually no choice other than to find for the 
defendants on implied warranty.”99 However, “[t]he plaintiffs 
claim[ed] that they were entitled to a charge based on the 
implied warranty of merchantability . . . proof of which requires 
neither specific representations nor reliance.”100 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed, pointing out the 
confusion of the trial court, and holding that the Plaintiff was 
entitled to a merchantability instruction, since “[t]he purpose for 
which this slide was purchased was obviously the ordinary 
purpose.”101 Hence, while the reviewing court eventually set 
things right, the trial court and the parties were needlessly put 
to the task of determining which warranty was violated, 
 
labeled.” Id. But the point still remains that the proof required to establish a 
merchantability claim is different from that needed to prevail under a fitness theory. 
 93 405 A.2d 665 (Conn. 1978). 
 94 Id. at 667–68. 
 95 Id. at 668. 
 96 Id. at 670 (footnote omitted). 
 97 Id.  
 98 Id. 
 99 Id.  
 100 Id. at 670–71 (footnote omitted). 
 101 Id. at 671. 
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resulting in a mistaken, outcome-determinative choice by the 
court, all due to the confusing analysis when a particular and 
ordinary purpose become conflated. There are other such cases in 
which the deserving plaintiff was not so fortunate.102  
If U.C.C. § 2-315 were eliminated, this confusion would go 
away. If, by words and actions, an express warranty that a good 
has certain attributes is created, then suit can, and should, be 
brought on an express warranty theory, regardless of whether 
the attribute is the ordinary purpose for which the good was sold. 
There would be no penalty to the plaintiff for also bringing an 
implied merchantability claim in addition to an express warranty 
one, since, where reasonable, “[w]arranties whether express or 
implied shall be construed as consistent with each other and as 
cumulative” under U.C.C. § 2-317.103 More importantly, however, 
there would also be no penalty to the plaintiff for not bringing a 
merchantability claim in that situation, since the two warranties 
would act independently, even if they might sometimes cover the 
same transaction.104 
 
 102 See Beth Schiffer Fine Photographic Arts, Inc. v. Colex Imaging Inc., No. 10-cv-5321 
(WHW), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65338 *1, *31–35 (D.N.J. May 13, 2014), as another example 
of the perils facing a plaintiff trying to choose the correct implied warranty theory because 
of the differences in proof between fitness and merchantability. There, the Plaintiff-buyer 
provided a variety of services to commercial and professional photographers, including 
making photographic prints. Id. at *1, *34. The Plaintiff purchased a printer, seeking a 
“professional grade machine.” Id. at *2. However, the printer did not work, and the Plaintiff 
brought suit claiming a breach of both fitness and merchantability warranties. Id. at *3–5. 
The court noted that “[i]f there is only one purpose asserted, a plaintiff may not assert 
claims under both implied warranties,” and that “[t]he particular purpose warranty ‘is not 
triggered when the buyer communicates to the seller that the buyer intends to use 
the goods for their ordinary purpose.’” Id. at *31–32 (quoting Ferrari v. Am. Honda 
Motor Co., No. A-1532-07T2, 2009 N.J. Super. LEXIS 346 (Jan. 30, 2009)). 
Determining that “processing and printing photographic prints for professional operators 
is ‘the general purpose for which [the machines are] manufactured and sold,’” the court 
found that there was not a breach of an implied warranty of fitness. Id. at *34–35 (citation 
omitted). The court acknowledged, however, had the Plaintiff “shown that [the] Defendant 
knew it intended to use its machine in a setting so susceptible to vibrations,” it may have 
prevailed on a fitness theory; but since that had not been made clear to the seller, a fitness 
claim could not be sustained. Id. at *35. The court also held that the Plaintiff had not 
proven a breach of the merchantability warranty as “Plaintiff ha[d] failed to create a 
genuine issue of material fact that the [machine] was not reasonably fit for its ordinary 
purpose,” since “[t]he record supports only a finding that the machine did not function in the 
circumstances in which Plaintiff attempted to use it.” Id. As such, the verdict for the Defendant 
was upheld, due to the Plaintiff’s confusion on what had to be proven. Id. at *31–36. 
 103 See U.C.C. § 2-317 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2017); see also id. § 2-315, cmt. n.2 (“A contract may of course include both a 
warranty of merchantability and one of fitness for a particular purpose.”). 
 104 See Corman, supra note 30, for a situation in which the two implied warranties 
might justifiably coexist in the same transaction. 
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B. Eliminating the Implied Fitness Warranty Would Change 
the Rule as to Disclaiming What are Now Fitness Warranties 
(and Rightly So) 
Another beneficial consequence of eliminating U.C.C. § 2-315 
is that warranty disclaimers for what is now the fitness warranty 
would be more appropriately analyzed and applied.  
Under the U.C.C. as it currently stands, two subsections 
govern the disclaimer of a fitness warranty. The first is U.C.C. 
§ 2-316(2), which provides that to disclaim an implied warranty of 
fitness, “the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”105 
The Code does not require the use of any particular word to 
disclaim the warranty¾not even the words “warranty” or 
“fitness.”106 However, the Code provides exemplar disclaimer 
language in § 2-316(2), stating that “[l]anguage to exclude all 
implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, 
that ‘There are no warranties which extend beyond the description 
on the face hereof.’”107 
The following subsection, U.C.C. § 2-316(3), provides instruction 
for how to disclaim both implied warranties¾merchantability and 
fitness¾at the same time. It provides that, “all implied warranties 
are excluded by expressions like ‘as is,’ ‘with all faults,’ or other 
language which in common understanding calls the buyer’s attention 
to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no 
implied warranty.”108 
The case on which the opening to this Article was loosely 
based, Thorman v. Polytemp, Inc., illustrates the relative ease 
with which a fitness warranty can be disclaimed.109 There, the 
buyer, a dry cleaner, purchased a steam heating unit for its 
premises.110 It discussed its needs and desires with the 
Defendant, telling the Defendant that it wanted to get the steam 
to run the new heating unit from its existing dry-cleaning 
equipment.111 As the court explained:  
 
 105 U.C.C. § 2-316(2). 
 106 See generally U.C.C. This is in contrast to a disclaimer of the implied warranty of 
merchantability, where the drafters have mandated use of the word “merchantability” for 
any valid disclaimer. Id. § 2-316(2). 
 107 Id. One cannot be faulted for doubting that if the “average Joe” who reads “[t]here 
are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof” on a purchase 
and sale document would immediately come to the conclusion that no warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose would apply to the transaction. Id. If nothing else changes as a 
result of this Article, hopefully a U.C.C. drafter will agree that some editing of the 
exemplar fitness disclaimer is warranted.  
 108 Id. § 2-316(3)(a). 
 109 1965 WL 8338, 2 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 772, 774 (N.Y. Cty. Ct. May 11, 1965). 
 110 Id. at 773. 
 111 Id. at 773–74. 
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Plaintiff contends that the contract was for the installation of the 
space heating unit for operation in the existing steam system in 
conjunction with the dry cleaning and pressing equipment which was 
being and was to be supplied from the same boiler; that, having 
surveyed the existing steam system and having ascertained the 
boiler’s rated BTU per hour output capacity and the requirements of 
the equipment it was then serving, defendant impliedly warranted 
that the heater unit it recommended was fit for plaintiff’s particular 
purposes as disclosed to defendant’s engineer; [and] that it knew that 
plaintiff relied on defendant’s skill and judgment in the selection and 
furnishing of a suitable space heating unit to be operable within the 
existing steam generating system.112 
However, the written contract between the parties had the 
following disclaimer: “The warranties and guarantees herein set 
forth are made by us and accepted by you in lieu of all statutory 
or implied warranties or guaranties [sic], other than title.”113 
There was no promise in the written contract concerning the 
steam from the dry cleaning equipment being sufficient to power 
the heating unit.114  
In finding for the Defendant, the court determined that:  
But for the disclaimer provisions of the contract, the facts here 
established would have sustained a finding that such an implied 
warranty rose in this case, and that the warranty had been 
breached. . . . These provisions negate plaintiff’s claim of an implied 
warranty of fitness for a particular or intended use or purpose, and 
bar his recovery, for he cannot be given the benefit of a warranty 
which he has expressly waived.115  
While a seller can thus relatively easily disclaim fitness 
warranties, express warranties are much harder to disclaim 
under the Code. The U.C.C. drafters made it clear that when a 
seller tries to negate or limit an express warranty, any such 
incompatible words of “negation or limitation [of the express 
warranty] [are] inoperative.”116  
Express warranties are difficult to disclaim because a 
consumer is more likely to be aware of the warranty as opposed 
to the disclaimer.117 By definition, an express warranty term 
 
 112 Id. at 773. 
 113 Id. at 774. 
 114 Id.  
 115 Id. 
 116 U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2017). 
 117 See Michael J. Phillips, Unconscionability and Article 2 Implied Warranty 
Disclaimers, 62 CHI. KENT L. REV. 199, 242–43 (1985) (“It seems safe to assume that 
sellers are not in the habit of pointing out implied warranty disclaimers to consumers. 
And it is difficult to believe that consumers actually read such disclaimers at or before the 
time of the sale. In fact, the realities of much consumer merchandising suggest that, as 
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must be a “basis of the bargain” for the warranty to apply, and 
any attempt to dangle an enticing term in front of a buyer, 
causing him or her to buy the product, and then whisking it away 
by some sort of written disclaimer on the receipt or in the 
contract, is abhorrent and not tolerated.118 Indeed, a seller who 
knows he or she is not going to stand behind a material, 
“dickered” attribute promised during contract negotiation may 
have committed fraud, and has demolished an important pillar 
on which the foundation of the bargain rests.119 
Carpetland U.S.A. v. Payne 120 is an example of how the Code 
deals with disclaimers in an express warranty context. There, 
Payne was shopping for carpet at the Defendant’s store, and was 
assisted by a sales representative named Lewis.121 As the court 
recounted, Payne testified, “I just asked [Lewis], uh, how long—was 
there a warranty with it, and he said a year. If anything went 
wrong, they would replace it . . . .”122 The carpet unraveled a few 
weeks after it was installed but Carpetland refused to replace it, 
relying on the warranty disclaimer found on the reverse side of 
the sales contract: “EXCEPT FOR DESCRIPTION ON 
REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, BUYER ACKNOWLEDGES THAT 
NO EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES (INCLUDING 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS) HAVE 
BEEN MADE BY SELLER AND SELLER HEREBY DISCLAIMS 
ALL SUCH WARRANTIES. THERE ARE NO WARRANTIES 
 
compared with other form terms, disclaimers have less chance of being read.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HARV. L. REV. 318, 330 (1963) 
(“Some jurisdictions go so far as to require that a seller ‘fairly procure’ his disclaimer by 
bringing it to the actual notice of the buyer.” (emphasis added)).  
 118 U.C.C. § 2-313. 
 119 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (Am. Law Inst. 1981); see 
also, e.g., Kurt M. Saunders, Can You Ever Disclaim an Express Warranty?, 9 J. BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 59, 62 (2015) (citation omitted) (“To allow a seller to disclaim an 
express warranty that the seller freely promised would appear to be illogical. As the 
comment to section 2-313 states: ‘Express warranties rest on “dickered” aspects of the 
individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of 
disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic dickered terms.’”); accord JOHN EDWARD 
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 101 (5th ed. 2011) (“It would, for example, be 
ludicrous to honor a clause generally disclaiming all express warranties. If given literal 
effect, such a clause would effectively disclaim even the express warranty arising from a 
description of the goods.”); Vincent A. Wellman, Essay: The Unfortunate Quest for Magic 
in Contract Drafting, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1101, 1109 (2006) (“A moment's reflection 
confirms that the very idea of disclaiming all express warranties is not only self-defeating, 
but would be ludicrous in effect. . . . If there were truly no warranties, then a contract to 
sell a car could be fully satisfied by delivery of a skateboard . . . because the complete 
absence of warranty would mean that there would be no basis on which to assert that 
delivery of a skateboard . . . did not satisfy the contract’s terms.”). 
 120 536 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
 121 Id. at 307. 
 122 Id. at 308. 
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WHICH EXTEND BEYOND THE FACE HEREOF.”123 The court 
was little impressed with Carpetland’s supposed disclaimer, and 
relying on the version of U.C.C. § 2-316(1) in the Indiana 
Commercial Code and prior case law, the court stated: 
If an express warranty and a disclaimer of an express warranty exist 
in the same sale, an irreconcilable conflict emerges. If it is 
unreasonable or impossible to construe the language of an express 
warranty and the language of a disclaimer as consistent, the 
disclaimer becomes inoperative. In the present case Lewis’s assertion 
that the carpet was guaranteed for one year and the disclaimer which 
purported to negate all express warranties were clearly 
inconsistent. . . . Therefore, the disclaimer is deemed inoperative and 
its existence cannot stand as a bar to Payne’s recovery.124 
Surely, if Payne could enforce the carpet replacement 
guarantee even in light of a disclaimer, the buyer in Situation II 
above should be able to enforce the representation that the watch 
would stay watertight down to 200 feet in the presence of a 
disclaimer as well. The law cannot allow the seller of the watch 
to dangle the down-to-200-feet dickered term in front of the buyer 
and then take it away by means of a few printed words on a sales 
receipt, like in Carpetland U.S.A., especially when it would not 
countenance such a tactic in Situation I. The buyer in both 
Situations I and II relied on the articulated promise of the 
watertight attribute of the watch and would be much more 
conscious of the warranty promise than any disclaimer slipped 
into the sales contract. The best way to stop the possibility of 
having a disclaimer trump a fitness warranty is to treat the 
warranty for what it is¾an express warranty¾and to use U.C.C. 
§ 2-316(1)’s direction that words of negation and limitation are 
inoperable to defeat any express warranty.  
C. Eliminating the Implied Fitness Warranty Would Allow for a 
More Equitable Application of the Parol Evidence Rule 
As explained above, analyzing disclaimers of what is now a 
warranty of fitness using the “words-of-negation” approach of 
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) is both fairer and consistent with normative 
bargaining.125 However, that approach is subject to one potentially 
significant limitation¾the parol evidence rule. U.C.C. § 2-316(1) 
provides, in its entirety: 
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and 
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be 
 
 123 Id. at 309. 
 124 Id. (citations omitted). 
 125 See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS 2017). 
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construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but 
subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence 
(Section 2-202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that 
such construction is unreasonable.126 
That is, when an express warranty and a disclaimer eliminating 
that warranty are both in evidence, the inoperative clause of 
U.C.C. § 2-316(1) directs that the disclaimer be disregarded. 
However, there is a possibility that an oral warranty made while 
the deal is being negotiated will never make it into evidence 
because it will be blocked by the application of the parol evidence 
rule, leaving only the disclaimer as the controlling term. This is 
especially more likely when the written contract has an effective 
integration clause, like in the case of Silver v. Porsche of the Main 
Line,127 where the court held that “the fully integrated, written 
purchase order contract containing an ‘as is’ clause would bar the 
introduction of parol evidence of pre-contract representations 
made by the Dealer . . . [because the integration clause] both 
‘cancels and supercedes’ any prior agreements . . . .”128  
Because the parol evidence rule might keep an oral warranty 
from the jury that was crucial to the buyer’s purchase decision, the 
parol evidence clause should be eliminated from U.C.C. § 2-316(1), 
as it is a terrible rule. However, its history and the way courts 
have diminished its impact make for an interesting story.  
The original 1951 version of § 2-316(1) had no parol evidence 
clause, and simply disallowed any express warranty disclaimer 
or words of limitation.129 The only mention of parol evidence was 
in Comment 2 to the provision, noting that a buyer’s false 
assertion of express warranty might be kept out of evidence by 
virtue of the parol evidence rule.130 However, in the 1957 version 
of the Code, the drafters added the parol evidence clause to 
U.C.C. § 2-316(1), so as to take the idea of protecting a wrongly 
accused seller with the parol evidence rule from a comment to the 
text (and it is that version which persists today).131  
The provision has not proven popular with the courts, 
understandably, because, in most cases, rather than keeping a 
 
 126 Id. (emphasis added).  
 127 No. 1057, 2015 WL 7424848, at *1, *3, *4 (Pa. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2015). 
 128 Id. at *3–4; see also, MURRAY, JR., supra note 119, § 101 (“A statement amounting 
to an express warranty will be inadmissible if the writing of the parties is so final and 
complete that reasonable parties would certainly include such a statement of fact about 
the goods in such a writing.”). 
 129 U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS, Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950). 
 130 Id.  
 131 U.C.C. § 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1957). 
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false assertion of warranty out of evidence, it has, in fact, 
deprived a deserving plaintiff of recovery. As a leading treatise 
put it, “[C]ourts are somewhat hostile toward efforts to employ 
the parol evidence rule in this way, particularly in cases 
involving consumers.”132 As a result, courts have come up with a 
number of ways to limit the application of the parol evidence rule 
in express warranty cases. These include: 
1) Finding that the written contract is only partially 
integrated, and thus allowing the express warranty into evidence 
as a “consistent additional term.” As Professor Richards noted, 
“If the buyer can persuade the court that the written agreement 
is only partially integrated, parol evidence of express 
warranties will be admissible as consistent additional terms”;133 
 
 132 3 FREDERICK H. MILLER & WILLIAM H. HENNING, HAWKLAND’S UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2A-214:7 (Carl S. Bjerre, database updated June 2019). 
 133 Janet L. Richards, As-Is Provisions¾What Do They Really Mean?, 41 ALA. L. REV. 
435, 441 (1990); see e.g., Wilson v. Marquette Elecs., Inc., 630 F.2d 575, 580 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(“There was no evidence that indicated the parties intended the manual or this sentence in 
the manual to be a final expression of their agreement. Therefore, the parol [express] 
warranties are not barred.”); Ltd. Flying Club, Inc. v. Wood, 632 F.2d 51, 57 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(“The description of the airplane as set forth in the logbook [the source of the express 
warranty] is . . . a consistent additional term and may be introduced to explain the actual 
agreement between the parties.”); Zutz v. Case Corp., No. 02–1776 (PAM/RLE), 2006 WL 
463539, at *1, *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 24, 2006) (“The Court finds that the parol evidence is 
admissible in this case. The purchase order form does not contain a merger or integration 
clause. . . . Thus, the substance of the alleged express warranties does not contradict the 
purchase order form.”); CGBM 100, LLC v. Flowserve US, Inc., No. G-15-026, 2016 WL 
7475701, at *1, *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 29, 2016) (“[T]he merger clause can offer Flowserve no 
escape since it cannot be seriously contended that Plaintiffs intended the written contract to 
be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.”); Potter v. Shields, 
140 N.W. 500, 501–02 (Mich. 1913) (“[T]he contract relied upon consists of a letter written 
by defendants and its alleged acceptance in an oral conversation. It cannot be claimed that 
the written instrument is the completed contract; and it has been repeatedly held that in 
such a case parol evidence may be had to show that a warranty constituted a part of the 
contract.”); A & A Discount Ctr., Inc. v. Sawyer, 219 S.E.2d 532, 535 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (“It is 
our opinion that the printed form contract executed by the parties was not intended to 
integrate and supersede all of the negotiations, representations and agreements between the 
parties, and that the evidence of the representation or warranties that the pool would be 
suitable for commercial use was not excluded by the parol evidence rule . . . .”); 
Barrientos v. Sulit, 133 Misc. 2d 1061, 1063 (N.Y. City Ct. 1986) (“The fact that the 
warranty was oral and the contract of sale was written does not invoke the parole 
evidence rule to ban proof of the warranty. I find that the written agreement was not 
intended as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement, and thus, 
evidence of express warranty was admissible.”); Morgan Bldgs. & Spas, Inc. v. Humane 
Soc’y of Se. Tex., 249 S.W.3d 480, 488 (Tex. App. 2008) (“Considering the surrounding 
circumstances, we conclude the written purchase agreement was not intended to embody 
the complete and exclusive terms of the agreement of the parties, and is only partially 
integrated. Under the parol evidence rule, the trial court could consider evidence of 
consistent additional terms to explain or supplement the terms of the written agreement.” 
(citations omitted)); WHITE, SUMMERS & HILLMAN, supra note 84, § 13:4 (“A written 
agreement may be contradicted by parol evidence if it [is] not intended by the parties as a 
final expression of their agreement.”); CLARK & SMITH, supra note 90, § 4:28 (noting that 
some courts will not only determine that a writing is partially integrated, but also hold 
Do Not Delete 5/22/20 8:28 AM 
194 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 23:1 
2) Finding that the written agreement is ambiguous, and 
thus the express warranty should be admitted to explain the 
vague contract;134 
3) Finding that the seller who makes an oral express 
warranty and thereafter attempts to disclaim it, has committed 
fraud, and the fraud vitiates the disclaimer;135 
4) Finding that the express warranty was an expression of a 
course of dealing, course of performance, or usage of trade, and 
thus admissible to explain the agreement. As one court explained, 
“the court admitted parol evidence to show that, under the parties’ 
course of performance, the language contemplated a 30-day 
warranty against latent mechanical defects that could not be 
discovered by the buyer’s initial inspection of the car”;136 and 
5) Finding that the disclaimer is unconscionable.137  
If the parol evidence provision in § 2-316(1) is not eliminated, 
these same limitations can be used to allow into evidence the making 
 
that an “oral express warranty is nothing more than an ‘additional consistent term’ for 
which the writing leaves room”). 
 134 See, e.g., Ohio Sav. Bank v. H.L. Vokes Co., 560 N.E.2d 1328, 1334 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1989) (“The purchase order was incomplete since it did not contain the engineers' actual 
specifications. Therefore, evidence regarding the engineers' specifications and how they 
were compiled, which would constitute additional terms of the contract, should have been 
admitted to explain or supplement the contract between the parties.”); Mobile Hous., 
Inc. v. Stone, 490 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973) (“[P]arol testimony [of the express 
warranty] was properly admitted to remove the said ambiguities with respect to the 
description of the subject matter of the contract.”). 
 135 See also, e.g., Pinken v. Frank, 704 F.2d 1019, 1023–24 (8th Cir. 1983) (“It would be 
indeed ironic if this court were to blindly apply a fraud preventing doctrine¾the parol evidence 
rule. . . . We simply cannot accept the proposition that the parol evidence rule was designed to 
foreclose a showing of fraud by preventing the admission of oral misrepresentations 
contradicting the terms of a written contract.”); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gardner, 208 S.E.2d 794, 
798 (Ga. 1974) (“In this case, parol evidence of the alleged misrepresentation was admissible 
on the question of fraud and deceit. As the antecedent fraud was proven to the 
satisfaction of the jury, it vitiated the contract. We hold, therefore, that the Uniform 
Commercial Code does not preclude an action in tort based upon fraudulent 
misrepresentation . . . .” (citation omitted)); George Robberecht Seafood, Inc. v. Maitland 
Bros. Co., 255 S.E.2d 682, 683 (Va. 1979) (“A buyer can show that a contract of sale was 
induced by the seller's fraud, notwithstanding . . . the written contract contains covenants 
waiving warranties or disclaiming or limiting liabilities. ‘The express warranty, which 
purports to be “in lieu of all other warranties” does not render the seller immune from 
fraud that induced [a] contract. The warranty stands no higher than the contract which is 
vitiated by the fraud.’” (quoting Packard Norfolk v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 565 (1956))). 
 136 Leveridge v. Notaras, 433 P.2d 935, 941 (Okla. 1967); see also, e.g., CLARK & SMITH, 
supra note 90, § 4:29 (“§ 2-202(a) provides that a writing may be ‘explained’ or 
‘supplemented’ by course of dealing or usage of trade under § 1-205 or by course of 
performance under § 2-208.”).  
 137 See, e.g., Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 641 P.2d 668, 671 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) 
(“[U]nder the UCC, courts are to limit the application of contract provisions so as to avoid 
any unconscionable result . . . it would be unconscionable to permit an inconspicuous 
merger clause to exclude evidence of an express oral warranty . . . .”); CLARK & SMITH, 
supra note 90, § 4:31 (2017) (noting that courts will invalidate a disclaimer or merger 
clause on unconscionability grounds in order to admit oral express warranties). 
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of an express “fitness” warranty, even in the presence of a merger 
clause, and even in the face of a parol evidence rule argument. That 
way, the “words of negation . . . being inoperative” doctrine would 
allow the warranty to be enforceable. Once again, it does not 
make sense for the buyer in cases like Situation II to be denied 
warranty protection through application of the parol evidence 
rule, as occurred in Silver, when there are so many arguments to 
defeat application of the rule in cases like Situation I. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When buyers express a purpose for which they want a good, 
and the seller undertakes to supply them with a good that will 
meet their needs, the seller has made an express promise that 
the good will suffice when the sale is consummated. Under 
normative bargaining expectations, that promise is as express as 
if the seller had actually said, for example, “the watch is 
watertight down to 200 feet.” As such, the law should treat these 
situations as express warranty claims, and eliminate as 
unnecessary the implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose. Not only does such an analysis make more analytical 
sense, it also solves some persistent problems that have plagued 
those seeking to allege and judge an implied fitness warranty case. 
VI. APPENDIX 
If any state, or the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws, is persuaded that U.C.C. § 2-315 should be 
eliminated and fitness cases should be analyzed as express 
warranty cases under U.C.C. § 2-313, what follows is suggested 
language to effect that change, presented in redlined form. 
Suggested Amendments to Article 2: 
§ 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise, 
Description, Sample, and Action. 
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: 
(a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to 
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the 
basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods 
shall conform to the affirmation or promise. Such affirmation of 
fact can be made by the seller directly, via language conveying 
such affirmation or promise, or by the seller indirectly, by 
providing goods purportedly meeting the buyer’s needs after the 
buyer has made it reasonably apparent that the buyer is looking 
to the seller to supply goods with particular attributes.  
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(b) Any description of the goods, whether by language of 
description provided by the seller, or by the seller’s supplying 
goods in response to a buyer’s request to the seller to provide 
goods with a particular attribute, which is made part of the basis 
of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall 
conform to the description. 
(c) Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of 
the bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the 
goods shall conform to the sample or model. 
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty 
that the seller use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” 
or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, or that 
the seller be the one who initially articulates the affirmation, 
promise or description, so long as the buyer has made it 
reasonably apparent that he or she is looking to the seller to 
supply goods which meet specified criteria and the seller 
thereafter undertakes to provide goods sufficient to meet buyer’s 
needs, but an affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a 
statement purporting to be merely the seller’s opinion or 
commendation of the goods does not create a warranty. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: Sections 12, 14 and 16, 
Uniform Sales Act. 
Changes: Rewritten. 
Purposes of Changes: To consolidate and systematize basic 
principles with the result that: 
1. “Express” warranties rest on “dickered” aspects of the 
individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that 
bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the 
basic dickered terms. “Implied” warranties The “implied” 
warranty of fitness rests so clearly on a common factual situation 
or set of conditions with a merchant seller that no particular 
language or action is necessary to evidence them it, and they it 
will arise in such a situation unless unmistakably negated. 
This section reverts to the older case law insofar as the 
warranties of description and sample are designated “express” 
rather than “implied.” However, by virtue of the 2019 
amendment, it also now establishes that what was previously a 
warranty of fitness, where a buyer describes the desired 
attribute(s) of the good and the seller furnishes a good that 
purportedly meet such attribute(s), creates an express warranty 
and should be analyzed under this section. 
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2. Although this section is limited in its scope and direct 
purpose to warranties made by the seller to the buyer, whether 
directly or indirectly, as part of a contract for sale, the warranty 
sections of this Article are not designed in any way to disturb 
those lines of case law growth which have recognized that 
warranties need not be confined either to sales contracts or to the 
direct parties to such a contract. They may arise in other 
appropriate circumstances such as in the case of bailments for 
hire, whether such bailment is itself the main contract or is 
merely a supplying of containers under a contract for the sale of 
their contents. The provisions of Section 2-318 on third party 
beneficiaries expressly recognize this case law development 
within one particular area. Beyond that, the matter is left to the 
case law with the intention that the policies of this Act may offer 
useful guidance in dealing with further cases as they arise. 
3. The present section deals with affirmations of fact by the 
seller, descriptions of the goods or exhibitions of samples, 
whether made directly to the buyer or by means of supplying 
goods to the buyer after learning that the buyer expects the seller 
to deliver goods with certain attributes, exactly as any other part 
of a negotiation which ends in a contract is dealt with. No specific 
intention to make a warranty is necessary if any of these factors 
is made part of the basis of the bargain. In actual practice 
affirmations of fact made by the seller, directly or indirectly, 
about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the 
description of those goods; hence no particular reliance on such 
statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric 
of the agreement. Rather, any fact which is to take such 
affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear 
affirmative proof. The issue normally is one of fact. 
4. In view of the principle that the whole purpose of the law 
of warranty is to determine what it is that the seller has in 
essence agreed to sell, the policy is adopted of those cases which 
refuse except in unusual circumstances to recognize a material 
deletion of the seller’s obligation. Thus, a contract is normally a 
contract for a sale of something describable and described. A clause 
generally disclaiming “all warranties, express or implied” cannot 
reduce the seller’s obligation with respect to such description and 
therefore cannot be given literal effect under Section 2-316. 
This is not intended to mean that the parties, if they 
consciously desire, cannot make their own bargain as they wish. 
But in determining what they have agreed upon good faith is a 
factor and consideration should be given to the fact that the 
probability is small that a real price is intended to be exchanged 
for a pseudo-obligation. 
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5. Paragraph (1)(b) makes specific some of the principles set 
forth above when a description of the goods is first given by the 
seller or the buyer. A description need not be by words. Technical 
specifications, blueprints and the like can afford more exact 
description than mere language and if made part of the basis of 
the bargain goods must conform with them. Past deliveries may 
set the description of quality, either expressly or impliedly by 
course of dealing. Of course, all descriptions by merchants must 
be read against the applicable trade usages with the general 
rules as to merchantability resolving any doubts. 
6. The basic situation as to statements affecting the true 
essence of the bargain is no different when a sample or model is 
involved in the transaction. This section includes both a “sample” 
actually drawn from the bulk of goods which is the subject matter 
of the sale, and a “model” which is offered for inspection when the 
subject matter is not at hand and which has not been drawn from 
the bulk of the goods. Although the underlying principles are 
unchanged, the facts are often ambiguous when something is 
shown as illustrative, rather than as a straight sample. In 
general, the presumption is that any sample or model just as any 
affirmation of fact is intended to become a basis of the bargain. 
But there is no escape from the question of fact. When the seller 
exhibits a sample purporting to be drawn from an existing bulk, 
good faith of course requires that the sample be fairly drawn. But 
in mercantile experience the mere exhibition of a “sample” does 
not of itself show whether it is merely intended to “suggest” or to 
“be” the character of the subject-matter of the contract. The 
question is whether the seller has so acted with reference to the 
sample as to make him responsible that the whole shall have at 
least the values shown by it. The circumstances aid in answering 
this question. If the sample has been drawn from an existing 
bulk, it must be regarded as describing values of the goods 
contracted for unless it is accompanied by an unmistakable 
denial of such responsibility. If, on the other hand, a model of 
merchandise not on hand is offered, the mercantile presumption 
that it has become a literal description of the subject matter is 
not so strong, and particularly so if modification on the buyer’s 
initiative impairs any feature of the model. 
7. The precise time when words of description or affirmation 
are made or samples are shown is not material nor is whether 
the words of description or affirmation or samples come first from 
the buyer or the seller. The sole question is whether the language 
or samples or models are fairly to be regarded as part of the 
contract. If language is used after the closing of the deal (as when 
the buyer when taking delivery asks and receives an additional 
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assurance, the warranty becomes a modification, and need not be 
supported by consideration if it is otherwise reasonable and in 
order (Section 2-209). 
8. Concerning affirmations of value or a seller’s opinion or 
commendation under subsection (2), the basic question remains 
the same: What statements or actions of the seller have in the 
circumstances and in objective judgment become part of the basis 
of the bargain? As indicated above, all of the statements of the 
seller, and the actions of the seller in furnishing the good after 
reasonable notice that the buyer is relying on the seller to 
furnish goods with particular attributes, do so unless good reason 
is shown to the contrary. The provisions of subsection (2) are 
included, however, since common experience discloses that some 
statements or predictions cannot fairly be viewed as entering into 
the bargain. Even as to false statements of value, however, the 
possibility is left open that a remedy may be provided by the law 
relating to fraud or misrepresentation. 
================================================== 
§ 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties. 
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express 
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit 
warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent 
with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on 
parol or extrinsic evidence ( Section 2-202) words of negation or 
limitation is are inoperative to the extent that such construction 
is unreasonable. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied 
warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must 
mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be 
conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of 
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. 
Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient 
if it states, for example, that “There are no warranties which 
extend beyond the description on the face hereof.” can be 
disclaimed or modified by: (i) use of the word “merchantability” 
and in case of a writing must be conspicuous; or (ii) use of 
expressions like “as is,” “with all faults” or other language which 
in common understanding calls the buyer’s attention to the 
exclusion of the warranty and makes plain that there is no 
implied warranty unless the circumstances indicate otherwise; or 
(iii) by course of dealing, course of performance or usage of trade.  
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2) 
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied 
warranties are excluded by expressions like “as is”, “with all 
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faults” or other language which in common understanding calls 
the buyer’s attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes 
plain that there is no implied warranty; and 
(b)(a) wWhen the buyer before entering into the contract has 
examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired 
or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty 
of merchantability with regard to defects which an examination 
ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him.; and 
(c) (b) Aan implied warranty can also be excluded or modified 
by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade. 
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in 
accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or 
limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy 
(Sections 2-718 and 2-719). 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: None. See sections 15 
and 71, Uniform Sales Act. 
Purposes: 
1. This section is designed principally to deal with those 
frequent clauses in sales contracts which seek to exclude “all 
warranties, express or implied.” It seeks to protect a buyer from 
unexpected and unbargained language of disclaimer by denying 
effect to such language when inconsistent with language of 
express warranty and permitting the exclusion of the implied 
warrantiesy of merchantability only by conspicuous language or 
other circumstances which protect the buyer from surprise. 
2. The seller is protected under this Article Protections for 
the seller against false allegations of oral warranties may be 
provided, when appropriate, by its this Article’s provisions on 
parol and extrinsic evidence and against unauthorized 
representations by the customary “lack of authority” clauses. 
This Article treats the limitation or avoidance of consequential 
damages as a matter of limiting remedies for breach, separate 
from the matter of creation of liability under a warranty. If no 
warranty exists, there is of course no problem of limiting 
remedies for breach of warranty. Under subsection (4) the 
question of limitation of remedy is governed by the sections 
referred to rather than by this section. 
3. Disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability is 
permitted under subsection (2), but with the safeguard that such 
disclaimers must mention merchantability and in case of a 
writing must be conspicuous. 
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4. Unlike the implied warranty of merchantability, implied 
warranties of fitness for a particular purpose may be excluded by 
general language, but only if it is in writing and conspicuous. 
5 4. Subsection (2) presupposes that the implied warranty in 
question of merchantability exists unless excluded or modified. 
Whether or not language of disclaimer satisfies the requirements 
of this section, such language may be relevant under other 
sections to the question whether the warranty was ever in fact 
created. Thus, unless the provisions of this Article on parol and 
extrinsic evidence prevent, oral language of disclaimer may raise 
issues of fact as to whether reliance by the buyer occurred and 
whether the seller had “reason to know” under the section on 
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 
6 5. The exceptions to the general rule set forth in 
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subsection (3) (2) are common 
factual situations in which the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction are in themselves sufficient to call the buyer’s 
attention to the fact that no implied warrantiesy of 
merchantability are is made or that a certain implied warranty it 
is being excluded. 
7 6. Paragraph (a) of subsection (3) (ii) of subsection (2) deals 
with general terms such as “as is,” “as they stand,” “with all 
faults,” and the like. Such terms in ordinary commercial usage 
are understood to mean that the buyer takes the entire risk as to 
the quality of the goods involved. The terms covered by 
paragraph (a) are in fact merely a particularization of paragraph 
(c) which provides for exclusion or modification of implied 
warranties by usage of trade. 
8 7. Under paragraph (b) of subsection (3), the implied 
warrantiesy of merchantability may be excluded or modified by 
the circumstances where the buyer examines the goods or a 
sample or model of them before entering into the contract. 
“Examination” as used in this paragraph is not synonymous with 
inspection before acceptance or at any other time after the 
contract has been made. It goes rather to the nature of the 
responsibility assumed by the seller at the time of the making of 
the contract. Of course if the buyer discovers the defect and uses the 
goods anyway, or if he or she unreasonably fails to examine the goods 
before he or she uses them, resulting injuries may be found to result 
from his or her own action rather than proximately from a breach of 
warranty. See Sections 2-314 and 2-715 and comments thereto. 
In order to bring the transaction within the scope of “refused 
to examine” in paragraph (b) subsection (3), it is not sufficient 
that the goods are available for inspection. There must in 
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addition be a demand by the seller that the buyer examine the 
goods fully. The seller by the demand puts the buyer on notice 
that he is assuming the risk of defects which the examination 
ought to reveal. The language “refused to examine” in this 
paragraph is intended to make clear the necessity for such 
demand. Application of the doctrine of “caveat emptor” in all 
cases where the buyer examines the goods regardless of 
statements made by the seller is, however, rejected by this 
Article. Thus, if the offer of examination is accompanied by words 
as to their merchantability or specific attributes and the buyer 
indicates clearly that he is relying on those words rather than on 
his examination, they give rise to an “express” warranty. In such 
cases the question is one of fact as to whether a warranty of 
merchantability has been expressly incorporated in the 
agreement. Disclaimer of such an express warranty is governed 
by subsection (1) of the present section. The particular buyer’s 
skill and the normal method of examining goods in the 
circumstances determine what defects are excluded by the 
examination. A failure to notice defects which are obvious cannot 
excuse the buyer. However, an examination under circumstances 
which do not permit chemical or other testing of the goods would 
not exclude defects which could be ascertained only by such 
testing. Nor can latent defects be excluded by a simple 
examination. A professional buyer examining a product in his 
field will be held to have assumed the risk as to all defects which 
a professional in the field ought to observe, while a 
nonprofessional buyer will be held to have assumed the risk only 
for such defects as a layman might be expected to observe. 
9 8. The situation in which the buyer gives precise and 
complete specifications to the seller is not explicitly covered in 
this section, but this is a frequent circumstance by which the 
implied warrantiesy may be excluded does not attach. The 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose An express warranty 
would not normally arise since in such a situation there is 
usually no reliance on the seller by the buyer the specifications 
are not usually part of the basis of the bargain between the two, 
since there is usually no reliance on the seller by the buyer. The 
warranty of merchantability in such a transaction, however, 
must be considered in connection with the next section on the 
cumulation and conflict of warranties. Under paragraph (c) of 
that section in case of such an inconsistency the implied 
warranty of merchantability is displaced by the express warranty 
that the goods will comply with the specifications. Thus, where 
the buyer gives detailed specifications as to the goods, neither of 
the implied warranties as to quality will normally apply to the 
transaction unless consistent with the specifications. 
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================================================== 
§ 2-317. Cumulation and Conflict of Warranties 
Express or Implied. 
Warranties whether express or implied shall be construed as 
consistent with each other and as cumulative, but if such 
construction is unreasonable the intention of the parties shall 
determine which warranty is dominant. In ascertaining that 
intention the following rules apply: 
(a) Exact or technical specifications displace an inconsistent 
sample or model or general language of description. 
(b) A sample from an existing bulk displaces inconsistent 
general language of description. 
(c) Express warranties displace an inconsistent implied 
warranty other than an implied warranty of fitness for a 
particular purpose warranty of merchantability. 
Official Comment 
Prior Uniform Statutory Provision: On cumulation of 
warranties see Sections 14, 15, and 16, Uniform Sales Act. 
Changes: Completely rewritten into one section. 
Purposes of Changes: 
1. The present section rests on the basic policy of this Article 
that no warranty is created except by some conduct (either 
affirmative action or failure to disclose) on the part of the seller. 
Therefore, all warranties are made cumulative unless this 
construction of the contract is impossible or unreasonable. 
This Article thus follows the general policy of the Uniform 
Sales Act except that in case of the sale of an article by its 
patent or trade name the elimination of the an express 
warranty of fitness depends solely on whether the buyer has 
relied on the seller’s asked the seller to use his or her skill and 
judgment in providing a product that meets any expressed 
needs of the buyer, or whether the seller has undertaken only to 
provide the good whose patent or trade name was provided by 
the buyer. ; the use of the patent or trade name is but one factor 
in making this determination. 
2. The rules of this section are designed to aid in determining 
the intention of the parties as to which of inconsistent warranties 
which have arisen from the circumstances of their transaction 
shall prevail. These rules of intention are to be applied only 
where factors making for an equitable estoppel of the seller do 
not exist and where he has in perfect good faith made warranties 
which later turn out to be inconsistent. To the extent that the 
Do Not Delete 5/22/20 8:28 AM 
204 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 23:1 
seller has led the buyer to believe that all of the warranties can 
be performed, he is estopped from setting up any essential 
inconsistency as a defense. 
3. The rules in subsections (a), (b) and (c) are designed to 
ascertain the intention of the parties by reference to the factor 
which probably claimed the attention of the parties in the first 
instance. These rules are not absolute but may be changed by 
evidence showing that the conditions which existed at the time of 
contracting make the construction called for by the section 
inconsistent or unreasonable. 
